None of current DEXs have solved the main technical problem – low speed and liquidity.
The other problem is advantages of larges exchanges, which have huge number of users and it is easier for them to create a decentralized network.
In addition, there is a big law risk – SEC has not approved current DEXs, nut USA is the biggest market for such platforms. The situation is that the first good project is going to win the competition and capture the market.
Now Ferrum is developing two main products – DEX and wallet. Both of the products have many other already existing analogues.
There are 8 people and 5 advisors. Half of a team are from investment funds and the other half has some technical background. There is one important moment – most of the founders haven’t changed their main workplace in LinkedIn.
Ferrum Network has strategic partners - TLG Ventures, KOSMOS, Token Research Group. Some of their team members represent these funds.
Ferrum’s business and token’s cost fully depend on the number of users. During the communication with the team, they have mentioned that their main market is USA, but it is still big legal risk with American jurisdiction. In addition, business is built on cryptocurrency market and if it is going to fail this project will be unclaimed.
- Tough competition from other blockchain platforms
- No public release is available
- Team previous experience spans many not widely known Romanian companies
- Lack of outstanding features for tokens
- High valuation for main sale and private investors with the high potential of cost reduction in the budget
- Not deep competitors analysis but much work already done in B2B stream
- MVP is not open-sourced yet
- Few team member with outstanding experience in widely known companies
- Weak token value in the network
- High estimated token pool valuation
- Lack of detailed financial information
- The designed network see significant obstacles from the telecom industry, not prepared for an effective maintenance of such industries
- Tough competition in the blockchain industry
- No prototype available
- Token functions are not described in details
- No financial information available yet
- "Network effect" entry barrier
- The new OS may add more complexity to the blockchain infrastructure
- Uncertain need globally in the solution
- Lack of experienced staff from well-known companies
- Uncertain activity of users in vouching
- No financial information available
- Tough competition on the market of scalable blockchains
- Edge on competitors is not clear due to the lack of technology described
- No prototype
- No roadmap
- Lack of details in the technology description
- Unexperienced team with doubtful achievements
- No exceptional token functions (the traditional model is used)
- Unclear use-of-proceeds plan with no significant adjustments
- High token pool capitalization for the project with no prototype
- The market has not seen successful tokenization projects yet, raising the risk of remaining the idea only "theoretical"
- No prototype available
- The team may be involved in other activity in their companies
- No distinguished and outstanding background in the team
- High peaq token pool valuation - 62M USD
- Fierce competition from other scalable blockchains
- The unclear need for high TPS from the demand side
- No successful projects presented even the half of the offering TPS
- No prototype
- No whitepaper
- Too long roadmap
- The team does not have LinkedIn pages
- The team is from Cheetah Mobile - distinguished company but with no relevance to blockchain technologies
- No details regarding the model and tokens
- Not distinguished funds on board
- No financial info available
- No one on the market has solved the problems that ARPA aims to solve
- Fierce competition from the similar projects
- ARPA promises to solve significantly difficult problems of multi-computations and security
- No prototype
- No whitepaper
- Mainnet release may be considered as late - Q2 2019
- The core technology is only to be released in Q1 2020
- Lack of legal and marketing specialists
- Lack of strong managers with the proven track record in successful projects
- Token functions are not announced yet
- Financial info is not announced yet
- The offer is likely to give no significant edge on competitors
- No prototype available
- Team members achievement and profiles are hardly available for proofing
- Legal risks regarding security functions of the token
- No information regarding valuation
- Seed bonuses have no lock-up period that increases the risk of the mass sell-off
- Uncertain purpose of "Investors Protection Fund"
- The structure of the coming token sale is unknown
- TODA.Network has a very strong competitor in its field - Bloxroute.
- The intended throughput of the protocol is unclear. - It is unclear how both decentralization and security will be achieved, along with high scalability. - The team claims that the project was founded in 2015. However, the first traces that were discovered date back to November 2016. - The last GitHub commit was made more than a year ago. - The roadmap is not available now. - The company is registered at the same address as PrivacyShell - the previous company of the founders.
- The roles in the project of "Honorary Founding Members" and "Executive Team" are unclear. - The team is scattered around San Francisco Bay Area and Ontario, Canada. - Several founding members do not mention Toda.Network as a workplace on Linkedin.
- The information about the fees calculation algorithm is unclear.
- Token metrics are to be announced.
The blockchain market is extremely competitive nowadays.
CEO and CTO has mainly scientific background, and have not built any company before. No publically available proof of team’s experience.
There is no difference with current market leaders.
Top-tier funds are not involved in project. Too high share of tokens for foundation.
The large corporation highly dominates AI market.
Access to large amounts of data is crucial for development AI.
No prove of such AI conception in any other sources.
It is easy to create MVP, but almost impossible to develop industrial implication.
Team does not have blockchain and AI background.
Not clear role of tokens.
Blockchain does not create additional value.
The project is substantially overvalued.
• The regulation is not ready for this project.
• The value of new stable cryptocurrency is unclear.
• The project does not organise ICO.
- Plenty of strong competitors in the intersection of AI and blockchain.
- There is no roadmap available.
- It seems that the product is now on a proof of concept stage. No private beta.
- 6 out of 8 team core team members do not claim Covalent as a workplace on LinkedIn.
- The team is scattered around several timezones and located in San-Francisco, Boston, Chicago, Princeton, and Shanghai.
- There are no team members with blockchain experience.
- The co-founder does not have business experience.
- There is little information available about the token role.
- No token metrics have been published yet.
- The competitive market of private blockchains
- The concept does not offer anything new for the industry
- PoW consensus algorithm does not align with the market trends
- lack of legal specialists that are recommended for privacy blockchains
- lack of strong corporate experience in distinguished well-known companies
- token model does not far differ from competitors
- High total token pool valuation even considering the special operation model
Huge competition in the industry of incentivization protocols.
Beta version of the protocol is unavailable. The current stage of development is unclear.
The founders work experience cannot be validated on Linkedin. The core software development team consists of intern students.
The token metrics have not been announced yet.
High competition in the sphere of protocols for the sharing economy. Monet Network is not the only attempt to serve marketplaces with blockchain technology. Other solutions, such as Origin, which is built on Ethereum, are focussed on the same market niche, and count with more developers and external funding.
Monet was expected to go live in June 2018 with a blockchain interface and mobile SDK. The team does not present detailed information of what was achieved so far. The roadmap is mediocre.
One of the co-founders does not have any work experience prior to joining Monet Network. Overal the core team members do not have vast experience before founding Monet Network. The team consists only of 3 members.
No token metrics have yet been released.
- Uranus is not the first ICO for cloud computing. Recently, ANKR and DeepCloud AI conducted ICOs for the projects in the same field.
- There are several existing blockchain projects for cloud-computing that include iExec, Golem, and SONM.
- Overall, the whitepaper was written in a fairly complicated way which confuses the underlying technology understanding.
- The roadmap is very sketchy and the stages of development are not clearly stated.
- The start of the product development is unclear.
- The registered patent's name is not given.
- There is now little information about the tokenomics of the project and the value added of the token is unclear.
- The expected fee levels are not given.
- The company valuation at 35M USD seems too high.
- The main competitors of Sovrin are KYC platforms, such as Coinfirm, KYC Legal, Civic.
- The Core product was developed by Evernym, not by Sovrin.
- Most of the team members had corporate careers and do not have previous startup experience.
- The core team members do not have blockchain experience.
- The token metrics have not been disclosed yet.
- It is unclear which token standard Sovrin will use.
• Strong competition from other cloud computing blockchain projects
• Not significant edge on competitors
• Amino will release the product after competitors
• Testnet is about to be launched only in Q1 2020
• No prototype available yet
• The team appears to be too academic and suffers from the lack of experienced business leaders
• Three-layer node architecture may turn too complicated and ineffective
• Financial information is not available
- High competition in the field of scalable blockchains. Solana is relatively late in the game with quite a few projects launching their mainnets in the next few months
- High competition in the field of scalable blockchains. Solana is relatively late in the game with quite a few projects launching their mainnets in the next few months
- Roadmap to scaling and adoption is not yet clear
- No major partnership announcements yet
- Lack of business substance (e.g. potential use cases) and a clear list of features in the current whitepaper.
- Currently, the token details have not yet been publicly released.
- Tokens will be distributed in Q1 2019, which means investors’ funds will be locked for quite a while.
• Tough competition and lots of projects combining cloud computing and blockchain
• Weak hype around the project that may be a signal of poor marketing activity - the risk of future obstacles in promotion
• No prototype available
• Lack of legal and marketing specialists
• Users do not have much motivation to hold tokens for a long-term period
• High total token pool valuation
• Tight focus on the local Japanese market
• Strategy includes a production of IoT hardware that sound as a weak point in the strategy
• Unclear and not detailed roadmap
• The project is in its early stage - demo
• Lack of legal and IoT specialists
• Some of the token functions do not require the blockchain technology implemented
• Overvalued token pool capitalization – 50M USD
- High competition in the field of scalable blockchains. MANX is relatively late in the game with quite a few projects launching their mainnets in the next few months
- After the growth of the throughput of the largest cryptocurrencies (sharding, plasma and other technologies) the attention to the later-introduced scalable blockchains may fall.
- Currently, the quantum computers are far from adoption so the core product of MANX might not be demanded by the market.
- Currently, the project is on a concept stage. The Testnet is only expected in March 2019.
- The public chain launch is only expected in May 2021.
- The experience of some of the team members cannot be validated.
- The team is scattered around USA, Canada, and China.
- The token value added is unclear.
- Vesting policy has not been revealed yet.
- The company valuation at $100M seems too high.
- The use of proceeds is not given.
Tough competition among other cloud computing projects
The product is still uncertain due to not clear description and lack of detail
No whitepaper and roadmap published yet
Team members resposibilities are uncertain
Lack of blockchain, legal and marketing experience in the team
Token functions are not clear now
No financial information available now
Huge uncertainty regarding a weight of mined coins
Contents Protocol does not align with VoD market trends and attract investments aiming to achieve not clear competitive advantage
Technical specifications are not available
No detailed Whitepaper available
It is impossible to check a prototype
Roadmap is not detailed
Most of team members do not provide their LinkedIn profiles
Lack of experienced blockchain developers
Blockchain does not add significant value to the product
Maximum cap is overvalued considering lots of work already done
Fierce competition from other blockchains with better characteristics
Burstcoin is vulnerable to attacks just in theory, but has never faced up to them in fact
It is not clear how Proof-of-Time will turn a competitive edge on Burstcoin
Proof-of-Space blockchains have their community but are not widely used
No code is written now
Chia criticizes Bitcoin for being eco-harmful – this critics is questionable
The team is still hiring its core developers
Lack of marketing and legal specialists
Legal uncertainty regarding some security features of the token
150M USD of Hardcap seems to be overestimated
Token pool capitalization is impossible to be evaluated
Financial metrics are unclear
Dividend policy and capital distribution are unclear
• Fierce competition from other blockchains and projects solving the similar problem
• No prototype available
• Unclear specifications of TPS
• Jura aims to develop the product too fast having nothing for now, so the roadmap is likely to be a subject of change
• The doubtful issue regarding mfun.network
• Lack of marketing and legal specialists
• Advisors are not disclosed
• Poor token functions
• Early investors are given a bonus up to 60% with 40% of tokens with no lockup
• Too high token pool capitalization both for seed and public investors, considering no prototype available
• The project is focused on Ethereum blockchain only that we consider to be risky
• Lack of strong business logic in describing the value proposition
• Whitepaper is not released
• Value proposition is questionable
• Lack of marketing, business and blockchain specialist
• The token functions are not clear now, and it is questionable whether the project needs this token
• Monetization model in unclear
• Financial metrics are not released yet
• Fierce competition from other blockchains
• The strategy has a lack of focus and tries to attract as many groups of users as possible
• Projects with stable coins are failing on the market and usually require too much trust
• No prototype available
• The team promises too high TPS rates – 8M
• Too complicated system with lots of modules to be developed
• Too fast roadmap for such a development process
• The team does not manage the ICO process by itself and engage Token Market
• Unclear monetization model
• Unknown terms for early investors
• Too high token pool capitalization considering no prototype available
• 15% of funds raised are dedicated to covering ICO campaign, that is too much
Recently, there were many decentralized cloud-computing ICOs launched so the market competition for Raven might be tough.
Technical details of Raven are unavailable and the competitive advantage is unclear.
The product is at the proof-of-concept stage.
The Mainnet Launch is only expected in September'19 and it is subject to change.
The team is scattered between Hong Kong and India.
2 out of 5 claimed team members do not mention Raven as a workplace on LinkedIn.
The team does not explain how the money raised will be spent.
The token issue scheme planned for the 5 months after TGE may devaluate the token price significantly.
Competition in the sphere of scalable dApp-protocols is more severe than in others, so it has to be taken into consideration. Several projects have already launched alternative protocols that aim to significantly increase the throughput of the blockchain protocols. That is why the potential growth and community attention to Harmony might be lower.
The current Testnet throughput of 13K TPS at 1800 nodes cannot be validated. MVP of the platform is not available. Public Testnet is expected only in Q4 2018. There are already several projects aiming to create decentralized AI data marketplace. The strategy of creating a new programming language might be at risk due to a slow adoption of the new language by existing projects and users. The current roadmap looks mediocre and gives only rough outlines of the product development.
The claimed fee size of 0.1% at max is subject to change. There is only little information available on the token economics.
The lockup scheme looks quite long. If the rumors about the TGE allocation are correct, then the post-ICO valuation will be $150 million which as an inflated number. The expenses distribution gives only a rough estimate and not detailed. The token price has not been given yet.
The regulation behind managing and investing funds might be a significant barrier to growth for SuperBloom. In order to simplify and structure ICO investing process for customers, several platforms have already been launched. SuperBloom solution will have to compete with IndigeGoGo ICO, Fund Platform, FastInvest, NousPlatform.
The validity of the results obtained by the platform are unclear and have to be empirically tested. It is not possible to test the private beta, the team only provides the screenshots of the product in WP. There are no links to GIthub for tracking the project development"
There are no links to verify the teams experience on company's website. The whole size of the project team is not clear. According to her Linkedin profile, the founder of the project is still employed at her previous startup - Future League. This may slower the pace of SuperBloom development. Some of the team members do not work at SuperBloom, according to their LinkedIn profiles. The experience of the third founder and CTO was not verified as there is no linkedin profile of him.
The information about the size of the fee is not given.
Post-money valuation of the project will be around 58M USD which is well above the median valuation of comparable companies on the market. The team bonus which will be around 4.4M USD is not frozen via vesting scheme.
Competition in the sphere of scalable dApp-protocols is more severe than in others, so it has to be taken into consideration. The existing blockchains, though not as scalable as Alza might become, still have first-mover advantage and might be better-off if they introduce scalability features, such as Lightning network, Sharding, Plasma, State Channels.
Competition in the sphere of scalable dApp-protocols is more severe than in others, so it has to be taken into consideration. Alza aims to deliver its testnet only by the end of 2018. By this time, the already-existing blockchains may already run its Mainnets and add scalability features, such as Plasma, Sharding, Lightning, etc. The registered entity of Alza is unclear.
All of the team members are still employed at their permanent workplaces thus have to combine Alza development and permanent employment. There are no blockchain specialists within the core team. Chris Liu ACM/ICPC contest winner - does not mention Alza as a workplace on his LinkedIn page.
There is no information on the expected size of the fee
Alza will only sell 25% of the tokens for public. It is unclear how the 40% tokens for "Block producing rewards" will be used.
Economy of scale and almost unlimited access to capital could make centralized models extremely efficient and cheap.
DAC has not been explained properly in white paper.
Hard cap and total market caps is not announced yet.
Universal reputation protocol might get low adoption due to the existence of reputation protocols on each platform.
Roadmap is not detailed and does not explain when the testnet will be launched. Now there is neither demo nor MVP available. The process of protocol integration into existing blockchain platforms might be complex and lengthy.
Now it is unclear how many people work on Layer Protocol development. 2 out of 3 co-founders do not mention neither Layer nor Pin Protocol as a workplace on their LinkedIn accounts.
Users might not want a universal reputation system, as if you have a series of bad experiences with malicious actors on one platform, it could affect you using other platforms. There is no information on the business model.
Further details of the use of proceeds categories are not specified. The lockup scheme for the team tokens is unclear.
Somewhat related competitors, such as Etherscan and Blockseer have large audience and may implement the tools of TxHash.
Testnet is expected only in Q2 2019.
Now There are just 3 people working in the team. The whole team size is unclear. Team members are not strong, "all star" experts in software development or cryptography. There are no specialists with deep expertise in blockchain/distributed systems/cryptography.
In our opinion, the event tracking protocol valuation of $37.5M looks overvalued. It is unclear what kind of a vesting scheme will be used for team bonus. The token release timeframe is unclear.
The The competing projects - SONM, Golem, and iExec have been on the market for a while now and had "first-mover" advantage.
The GitHub page of the project has only one repository which is empty. GitHub was only created in late April. The domain was only bought at the end of April, the twitter was created around the same time. MVP is not available.
The CEO does not have a strong track record in cloud computing, AI, or blockchain. The CTO did not work at AWS, as claimed on the company's website. The experience of 2 out of 6 software developers prior to joining DeepCloud cannot be validated. The Blockchain developer is not employed at DeepCloud on full-time and additionally works on a freelance platform (Toptal) and at XSN-Core. The team is scattered across the world and different time zones. The team members are located in Singapore, San Francisco, Egypt, Ukraine, Netherlands, Florida, and Mexico. The team does not have full-time blockchain experts. There are no strong blockchain advisors and partners. The Core team members do not have strong entrepreneurial experience prior to joining DeepCloud AI.
Unit economics is poorly described.
There is no information about the team and advisors tokens lockup schemes. The competing projects - SONM, Golem, and iExec have been on the market for a while now and had "first-mover" advantage. The team aims to open two offices: one in Singapore and one in San Francisco. The reasoning for this strategy is unclear. There is no information about lockup schemes for early investors' bonus tokens.
Stratis, Lisk, Ark, BlockApps, and Hyperledger, which are similar to Esprezzo, already have large communities which may decrease the potential for Esprezzo development.
Further development milestones in the roadmap might be described in more detail. MVP is not ready yet. The process of different blockchains integration might be complex and could take longer than expected.
The CEO's experience lies on the intersection of IT and business; he does not have a background in blockchain or decentralized ecosystems. The whole team also works on CampusTap. Focusing on two projects at the same time might put Esrezzo development at risk Blockchain Strategists education is unclear.
The product line offering might be subject to change.
The use of proceeds description is not detailed. Post ICO valuation might seem high at first sight.
Tough competition with similar blockchain projects Lack of significant competitive edge Lack of detailed competition analysis
Developments cannot be traced via Github Demo version demonstrates poor range of functions
Team poor experience in development before entering RateX Lack legal and relevant blockchain specialists
Possible obstacles of accepting tokens by large merchants
Overestimated Hardcap and Softcap – 25M and 20M USD 60% of tokens were purchased on private sale with 20% bonus that increases the risk of mass sell-off when entering exchanges
Fantom is not the first platform aiming to simultaneously process multiple blocks. IOTA, Byteball, Nano and Hedera Hashgraph already started developing projects with somewhat similar technology.
There is no link to GIthub or other source to track the product development Currently, beta version of the platform is not available for the public A detailed roadmap has not yet been published.
Now team does not have marketing specialists with proven track-record.
The exact "gas" prices have not been published yet and subject to change.
However, b0x is not the very first project in this field: Lendroid, dharma, and dydx. The last one has a stronger core team of developers, experienced working in financial tech infrastructure companies, and already attracted investment from Andreessen Horrowitz, Polychain Capital, and several other top tier funds. Lendroid already has a mechanism for margin calls. The high frequency of exchange hacks might be a risk for the integration of more sophisticated trading activity tools.
The roadmap is very high-level and only provides the development stages up until the end of 2018.
The core team has never had experience in ruling any business. All these factors diminish the project success, not only in the TGE campaign, but also in the future platform launch. The company is not supported by well-known advisors and community There is only two software engineers in the project, all other people have experience in different fields. There are no marketing specialists in the team.
According to the model, the lender will pay 10% fee. But at the same time the team states that the protocol will enable to avoid some intermediaries and banks for lender. The team does not state who will perform the function of Oracle
The project valuation is above the median of similar projects. For instance, Lendroid aims to raise only 5000 ETH, which is around 4M USD as of 7th of May 2018. The given allocation of funds is not quite detailed and does not give much information.
Even though Power does not have direct competitors, there are several projects that have already created and launched somewhat similar products. They are NEM, HyperLedger, Exonum, EOS, Cosmos Network. EOS has one of the largest caps in the market and is supported by a large community, Cosmos.Network has a good technical background, the rest also have larger communities and have already released products to the audience.
The usage of Rust programming language for smart contracts instead of Solidity may lower the expansion rate of the system The process of products integration into the blockchain system of Power does not seem clear and might be complicated in reality. The team aims to develop various elements of the product which may take signifcant amounts of time. However, the team does not give clear timeframes for the development of elements. There is no information about the tehcnial audit of the platform and the bandwith of the chain The patents has not yet been claimed.
the experience of the team members does not seem enough for the project development, considering the amount of work needed to be done. The LinkedIn profiles of some of the team members are not available to check. There is no information about the previous experience of the CTO of Power.
It is hard to measure the commercial viability of the platform due to the wide variety of commission models possible to implement The economics of the token is not given. It is unclear how the tokens will be used in the system.
The token distribution is not given so the company valuation is unclear. The hardcap is not given. The provided expenses distribution is sketchy and does not give a clear understanding of the funds allocation. The price of the token is not given.
Strategical focus on Korean market may appear to be not rational Tough competition from established dApps platforms and next-gen ones
Higher blockchain speed does not have detailed numerical characteristics No prototype available yet
Poor team experience in blockchain projects Lack of marketing legal specialists
Edenchain tokens will be available in the 1Q of 2019 only
Overestimated hardcap of 24M USD Overestimated token pool capitalization of 60M USD Team, advisors and partners share of token pool is 43% increasing the risk of token price dramatic impact
Wireline has direct competitors in the market of application infrastructure services with working products, such as Readz, woopie, and Zmags. There are a couple of blockchain projects also aiming to build decentralized micro-services infrastructure - DADI and Golem which already raised funds and have their tokens traded on exchanges.
Admins of the telegram chat are not active. There are messages on Bitcointalk thread saying that the project is dead, the activity stopped in January 2018. It is not clear if the project can attract a large enough sub-sector of the global open-source developer community to make the project a success. As of March 15, the companies website says that "Wireline is in developer preview". Any further information about the product development is not clear.
According to some of the team members Linkedin profiles, they are not employed at Wireline.io
Post-money valuation will be around 300M USD which is a tremendously high number and is way above the comparable companies The amount of tokens held by the foundation is high and may cause a massive sell off by the team, which will cause fast devaluation of tokens The description of anticipated expenditures is quite broad and not specified.
There are already several successful platforms with large customer base, such as Ethereum, Lisk, Waves, and Stratis; that is why it might be hard for Hedera Hashgraph to expand its network and attract new customers due to network effect. The development of so-called "Blockchain 3.0/4.0" projects can be a serious risk for the growth of popularity of Hedera Hashgraph.
Beta version of the network is not available and the launch date is not clear. The roadmap is not given. The SDK with demo apps is provided by Swirdls, not by Hedera Hashgraph. It is worth taking into account the possible risk associated with the patent law, which can arise in the event of the growth of Hedera Hashgraph and the occurrence of claims from the Swirlds.
Most of the team members are still working for Swirlds, so it might slower the pace of Hedera project development.
As Hashgraph creates multiple acyclic graphs, this leads to the impossibility to reward Miners.
The team would like to raise 200M USD. This figure is way above the median valuation of comparable companies. The amount of total token supply is not given. The exact token distribution is not given.
There are already several projects aiming to create tokenization protocols, which already raised money. For instance, BankEx which creates PoA protocol to tokenize different types of assets, already raised 70M USD and is about to launch asset-backed exchange. The regulation behind investment funds might be a significant barrier to growth for Nousplatform.
Facebook page seems pumped. There are 26K+ likes, while the average activity for the other social networks is no more than 3K. As Nousplatform will provide its services to investment funds, the legal framework for establishing Nousplatform is one of the most critical aspects of the business. Currently the product is not available to test, there is no public beta and no information if MVP is ready.
The CEO of Nousplatform was only selected in January and is still employed at his previous job. The core team is spread around the globe and is not fully operates from Edinburgh - the city where Nousplatform is registered. Blockchain developer of the product is not employed by Nousplatform, according to his LinkedIn profile. The technical part of the team does not have strong expereince. The front-end developer is majored in education and does not have prior relevant development experience. The experience of several developers of Nousplatform cannot be verified via Linkedin.
The model might be unsuccesful if not compliant with the current investment funds regulations.
The amount of kept tokens - 80% - is high. Nousplatform may have high levels of complicance risk in case all the requirements of Regulation D of the United States Securities Act will not be followed. The expenses distribution is not given in a detailed manner. Hard Cap is above the median values for comparable companies. The rationale behind issuing two types of tokens is not clear.