• This product is mostly interested for SME, which is not the biggest players on loyalty programs.
• The company was founded by two brothers without enough previous experience.
• Only 2 developers are non-remote.
• There are no initiatives to pay for creating own brand tokens by QBX tokens. It is better to pay in fiat money.
• The opportunity to exchange brand loyal tokens for another brand loyal tokens or fiat money makes such brand loyal tokens useless.
• On the one hand, the product is ready, on the other, 49% of funds would be allocated to further product development.
• Huge difference between seed, private and public sale - investors are in unequal conditions.
- Competition in the sphere of scalable dApp-protocols is more severe than in others, so it has to be taken into consideration.
- The existing blockchains, though not as scalable as Alza might become, still have first- mover advantage and might be better off if they introduce scalability features, such as Lightning network, Sharding, Plasma, State Channels.
- Low GItHub activity.
- Testnet is not available for public.
- There is no explanation on what the base consensus algorithm will be.
- PDX aims to create a blockchain for small amd medium-size businesses. However, the team members do not have experience in working with such businesses.
- Several team members experience cannot be validated.
- None of the team members has blockchain experience.
- The token role description is vague.
- There will be only 20% of the tokens available for sale. 80% of the tokens will be reserved by the project.
- Lenovo Capital investment in PDX can't be validated.
- The company valuation of $60M seems too high.
- The websites of Tora and Caspian look very similar.
- There is no link to GitHub to track the product development.
- It is unclear when the product development has been started.
- The motivation of blockchain integration into the system is unclear.
- The team claims that they already connected 10 exchanges to its system. The list of exchanges is unknown.
- The team is scattered between Hong Kong, Tokyo, San Francisco, and London.
- Most of the team members still work at Tora and have to work at two companies simultaneously.
- None of the core team members has blockchain related experience.
- The rationale behind issuing native token is unclear.
- The list of CSP token holders benefits is unclear.
- Competition in the sphere of scalable dApp-protocols is more severe than in others, so it has to be taken into consideration.
- The existing blockchains, though not as scalable as AERGO might become, still have first-mover advantage and might be better off if they introduce scalability features, such as Lightning network, Sharding, Plasma, State Channels.
- Technical paper and smart contract links are missing.
- There is no link to Github.
- The team is scattered across different time zones. They are located in London, South Korea, Hong Kong, and New York.
- Several team members are still employed at Blocko, according to their LinkedIn pages.
- AERGO will sell only 30% of the tokens. Therefore, most of the tokens will be centralized in the project.
- The market for online entertainment content is quite saturated and has several large players, including YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, and others.
- The mainnet of the underlying Blockchain - Zilliqa - has not been launched yet. There is no guarantee that it will be launched as expected.
- The product usecase is weak and does not seem to overtake YouTube.
- The requirement to pay fees for the YouTube-like service makes the use-case feasibility even lower.
- The roadmap is mediocre.
- Overall the team does not seem outstanding.
- The fact of co-founding "Channel 9" by one of the team members cannot be validated.
- The team is scattered around UK, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.
- There are no people with blockchain experience within the team.
- There are no advisors from Zilliqa while BOLT aims to launch its platform on their blockchain platform.
- NEP-5 tokens are supported on far less exchanges than ERC-20 tokens and usually suffer from low liquidity.
- The fact that users can pay with fiat money or Bolt tokens could limit token adoption. Even though there are savings to be made by paying with tokens, people tend to stick to what they know.
- DApps generally have low upside potential in terms of market cap.
- The valuation of $30M is quite high for a dApp.
- Government regulation uncertainty regarding the infrastructure of privacy blockchains
- One of the strongest features of the project (Security Token issuing) strongly depends on government regulation of cryptocurrency, that appears to be unpredictable
- Designed infrastructure appears to be too complicated for such a fast roadmap - some delays are expected
- No prototype available yet
- Lack of strong legal expert - it is essential for the project's plans
- Token functions are limited (but with the proven model)
- It is not clear how much will be raised on private sale stage
There are plenty of similar projects that were trying to issue the same solutions but did not succeed. The services provided by PayGine have already been introduced by Revolut and is in active development and global expansion.
The idea is not unique and several other larger projects already working on the same solutions for a while. It is unclear what has been done by Best2Pay and PayGine separately. There are legal risks pegged to the bank acquisition procedure. The current stage of PayGine development is unclear.
There are no people with blockchain experience within the team. Most of the team members have corporate management experience and did not start and scale companies by themselves. The team members are scattered around different time zones. They live in Florida, Singapore, Moscow, Donetsk, and Saint Petersburg.
The range between Soft and Hard Cap is quite high and equals to $27M. When compared to the similar projects, the valuation seems too high. Only 27% of the tokens will be available for sale. Most of the ICO collected funds - almost 65% - will be used for a bank acquisition. There are huge bonuses (up to 20%) for the public sale participants.
- The high competition in the filed os decentralized storage platforms might be a downside for Lightstreams development.
- There is no link to GitHub to validate the product development.
- The testnet is only expected in Q1 2019. By then, the competing projects will already have their mainnets in operation for a while.
- None of the team members gives the links to their LinkedIn profiles.
- Some of the team members do not claim Lambda as a workplace on LinkedIn.
- There are no people with blockchain experience.
- Lambda will use basic Proof of Work consensus mechanism.
- The project valuation of $80M seems too high.
- Lambda will sell only 30% of the tokens.
- High competition in the sphere of smart-contracts development tools.
- The most successful ICOs in this field were launched back in 2016 i.e. have early mover advantages.
- Testnet is not available yet.
- The motivation for the customers to issue tokens on Emotiq platform and not somewhere else is unclear.
- The development of a proprietary programming language - Ring - may not be adopted by communities.
- The team members are located in Moscow, Zug, Tucson, Mexico, Los Angeles, and Toronto.
- David McClain does not have any experience except Emotiq mentioned on his Linkedin page.
- Now there is not enough information available on the business model of the platform.
- Token economics is not given in a detailed manner.
- The unsold tokens will be kept in reserve by Emotiq, to be used for future funding needs.
- Post-ICO valuation will be equal to $120M which seems extremely expensive.
- There is no information on the use of proceeds.
• Tough competition among exchanges
• Not significant and vague edge on competitors
• Strategic goal is to outperform crypto exchanges in volumes thanks to the token model designed but this parament does not indicate a fundamental leadership
• Technical specifications are not available
• Prototype is not available yet
• Roadmap is not detailed and includes not relevant information
• Lack of experienced blockchain developers
• The model is likely to attract doubtful and questionable tokens for listing
• Token functions are poor and do not add significant and fundamental value to the project
• Maximum cap and Hardcap are overvalued
A lot of location data is freely available for most usecases. The biggest part of location data is owned and used within huge corporations.
Last information about numbers of transaction is dated Oct 2017. There is no opportunity to freely use the final product of Fysical or Fysical Labs. Only landing pages is available. No information of app, which provides an location data or about any buyers.
Not clear the role of founders of Fysical Labs in new project Fysical. Almost no technical team.
According to information on site, currently marketplace model is not balanced. (only 20 buyers and 1000+ suppliers)
There is no clear mechanism for token value growth.
Competition on chatbots market is huge, only the best project will survive.
For some reasons, responses in current chatbots are extremely slow.
CEO and Founder have only corporative experience.
The monetization of the chatbots would not happen in near future.
There are already tons of large players in the market, ranging from banking wallets (CitiPay) to Fintechs (PayPal, Venmo). ",
TON has direct competitors across different services the company would like to build from messaging to decentralized VPN services.
As of Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism, it\u2019s also in several large Blockchain projects, including Ethereum, immediate roadmap.
The main product risk for TON is that many of the services have already been introduced by competitors and therefore might gain significant market share by the time TON launching its services.
As WhatsApp and Facebook messenger already have large market shares among western countries, it might be hard for the project to expand its market share in western countries.
All TON services are now only concepts and the characteristics of the final system may ultimately be very different from those claimed in WP, especially in terms of network bandwidth.
At the moment, the whole project team is involved in Telegram. Despite the fact that TON and Telegram are strongly interrelated projects, their development should be separated.
In this regard, it is not clear which direction of the development will be the main focus at early stages.
There is no data on the evaluation of economic effects of each of the indicated areas.
The given cost distribution is not detailed and only highlights the use of funds.
The price per customer might be significantly lower than $40 for WhatsApp, as there are many customers of Telegram among countries with oppressive regimes. That is why the valuation of the company is arbitrary.
Since the outlines of the TON and Telegram projects are very diffused, this can eventually lead to the fact that not the ICO participants, but the founders of Telegram will be the main beneficiaries of the sale process.
The collected funds will finance Telegram roadmap, which is in fact closely related to TON, but still a different project.
The market of online gig economy grew by 26% during the last year, however the part of the market where GEMS will operate - Clerical and data entry - did not grow at all in net terms.
The micro-tasks market is heavily dominated by large players, such as Amazon Mturk and CrowdFlower.
Also, there is another ICO entering the micro-tasks market that recently raised 30+ million dollar (Storm).
There is no information regarding the number of alpha-version users.
The popularity of GEMS is heavily depending on overall cryptocurrency acceptance and the pace of crypto-to-fiat conversion mechanisms adoption. The main area where GEMS can attract more customers (developing markets) currently does not have convenient tools for crypto payments and conversion.
The date of token utilization and availability of services to use is not clear.
Even though GEMS states that they will cope with the problem of multiple verifications of the work done, they do not explain how the problem will be addressed.
The roadmap given on Medium post does not seem feasible as the team consists of 2 people.
None of the advisors mention GEMS as their advisory-project on Linkedin.
Apart from the founders of the project, the team behind GEMS is not clear.
The business model is only conceptually described so there are no figures that can clarify the commercial viability of the platform.
The team says that the project will facilitate most of the transactions off-chain in order to pay less for GAS. However, GEMS does not explain how the gas payment will be paid in the end.
The proposed competitive advantage over traditional platforms is based on the assumption that using GEMS protocol, work providers will hire less workers. This assumption is not proved.
The team of the project bans telegram channel users who ask questions about the financial side of GEMS.
GEMS does not clearly states the financial metrics. The token distribution structure is not completely clear.
The initial hard cap will be around 18 trillion USD which is tremendously huge number for a new project. As there will be 2B tokens issued, the price per token will be around 9K USD. Therefore, the ROI might be low or even negative.
According to the same post, 75% of tokens will not be available for sale and will be kept by team. Moreover, there is no information about vesting scheme for the team reserves.
The project will use Dutch auction model for its token price determination. That is why the probability of a huge price dump when GEM token hits the exchange is very likely.
There is no information about the time frames of ICO.
Tough competition among blockchain and industry projects
Lack of prototype and whitepaper and early stage of the product Current roadmap version ends in July 2018, but it is to be updated
CEO is not experienced enough in management Lack of marketing and legal specialists
Token may appear to have additional functions after WP release
No financial detailed released yet
High level of competition in the field of scalable blockchains: ICON, EOS, LIsk, Ark, Lisk, Cardano, Hedera, QuarkChain, Zilliqa, Credits.
The Mainnet launch is only expected in Q2 2019. No MVP available. There is no link to GitHub. Whitepaper explains the HashNET Network in a Very Basic Way. The intended product functionality seems too broad and complex for development. The whole list of competitive advantages of Tolar Hashnet over ICON, EOS, LIsk, Ark, Lisk, Cardano, Hedera, QuarkChain, Credits, or Zilliqa is unclear
Now there are no announced partnerships. Only one board member has previous blockchain experience. Other 7 board members have background in management or finance. Not every team members' experience can be validated on LinkedIn. Only 2 out of 8 tech team members have previous blockchain experience. Plenty of the team members came from various roles at COTRUGLI Business School, not from real business.
It is unclear how many tokens will be needed to run a masternode.
Only 35% of the tokens will be available to investors. The token lockup scheme for the team (20%) and advisors (2.5%) is unclear. High hardcap ($35M) and valuation ($100M) after ICO when compared to competitors(Ziliqa - $20M, Credits - $22M). There is no information about the use of proceeds.
Except BAT, all other digital advertising blockchain platforms did not gain popularity and have ROI<1
The product development started only in February 2018. Beta version is only expected in January 2019.
There are just 5 developers in the team of 33 members. No neural networks experience. There are no experts in digital advertising within the team. The developers are located in 4 different time zones. They reside in Belgorod, Altai Region, Moldova, and London. The experience of 4 out of 5 developers prior to joining Ubex is unclear. Some of the team members do not claim Ubex as a workplace on LinkedIn.
Now it is only a little information given on the expected fee size. The unit economy is now unclear.
Maximum transaction volume during the token sale is not set. There is no information about the use of proceeds. The team will give up to 20% bonus for public sale investors but does not lockup the bonus.
Tough competition among successful blockchain projects
The product is not far different from competitors and does not have any significant edge Only developers are able to test the prototype
The team members are also engaged in Ovelock projects Lack of marketing and legal specialists Only 5 team members
Not sold tokens will not be burnt and will be held by the company for future sales Own token applied has poor rational grounds
It is not clear how raised funds will be distributed
Most of the current projects in this field did not gain significant ROI since ICO.
No beta has been released yet. Overall, the roadmap now looks quite sketchy.
Not every team member has page on LinkedIn. The team members are located in Detroit, Sydney, Singapore, Fort Collins. Some of the team members do not mention Moonlight as a workplace.
The contracts conditions are not given.
The use of proceeds description is not detailed.
Fantom is not the first platform based on DAG. IOTA, Byteball, Nano and Hedera Hashgraph already started developing projects with the same technology. Hedera Hashgraph aims to raise 18M USD, which is twice smaller than Fantom wants to attract.
There is no link to GIthub or other source to track the product development As of May 15th 2018, Beta is not available
Most of the team members are located in Korea, while some key employees are in Australia. One of the senior developers does not have any other experience stated on Linkedin. Not all of the team members have Linkedin profiles.
It is now unclear how the platform will monetize its activity.
The company valuation - 100M USD - seems comparably high. The team does not clarify what "Market Development" reserved tokens will be spent for. The team gives a split of expenses only for 3 broad categories: Development, Operations, Marketing. This seems as a sketchy distribution.